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Abstract—This paper analyzes the spectrum trading 
problem in virtualized fifth generation (5G) networks in 
order to enhance the network performance with respect to 
the spectrum utilization. The problem is modeled as a 
Many-to-Many Matching (M2MM) game with utility-based 
preferences and determines the matching between mobile 
network operators and mobile virtual network operators. 
The two proposed versions of utility functions for each set 
aim at maximizing the satisfaction of both sets with 
conflicting interests and improving the overall spectrum 
efficiency. In the simulation evaluation, the proposed 
scheme is compared with three different schemes in terms 
of the system utility, individual and pair matching 
satisfaction. We also investigate the scalability aspects, the 
strategy plan impact on the matching performance of our 
proposed scheme, and, at the same time, we attempt to make 
appropriate assumptions closer to reality. Our proposed 
scheme shows much better performance than the other 
schemes achieving a quite high level of satisfaction for the 
matching result on both sets. 
Keywords—spectrum trading, 5G, virtualization, matching 
theory, many-to-many. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Undoubtedly, the most precious and scarce resource 
for wireless communications is spectrum frequency. 
Currently, the spectrum policy determines that most of the 
available spectrum is assigned to wireless mobile 
companies on a long term basis for large geographical 
regions.1 Additionally, many mobile subscribers, several 
wireless devices per user and thousands of new 
applications create the need for frequency bands. As a 
result, both licensed and unlicensed bands are becoming 
congested and several times licensed bands are identified 
as underutilized,2 even in the most overcrowded cities, 
such as New York,3 due to spectrum mismanagement. 
Therefore, this issue quickly leads to the investigation of 
solutions for reliable utilization of licensed spectrum 
bands. 
Besides, the forthcoming 5G networks are anticipated 
to bring not only very high throughput, exceptional 
quality of user experience, and ultra-low latency, but also 
improved spectral efficiency, compared to the current 
legacy technologies of 3G and 4G networks. In general, 
addressing these requirements will demand much bigger 
bandwidth, densification of small cells and wide use of 
massive MIMO and millimeter-wave technologies.4 More 
specifically, the densification of small cells will increase 
both the network capacity and spectral efficiency by 
offloading traffic from macro cells and by reducing the 
cell radius, respectively.5 Then, the millimeter-wave 
frequency bands will increase the throughput by offering 
wide chunks of available unused bandwidth and their 
limited propagation characteristics (i.e., high path loss) 
can fit well with the densification of small cells. In the 
same sense, massive MIMO technology will not only 
increase the throughput, but it will also improve the 
spectral efficiency by applying spatial multiplexing of 
many terminals in the same time-frequency resource.6  
In fact, 5G technology and its attributes can improve 
the spectral efficiency. Additionally, wireless 
virtualization, as a new fundamental functionality for the 
5G networks,7 could help the efficient management of 
spectrum resources, too. Resource virtualization helps 
simplify the control of virtual networks and avoid over-
provisioning by assigning wireless resources intelligently 
based on the actual need.8 Essentially, wireless 
virtualization concerns the creation of multiple separate 
virtual networks by physical resource sharing. This major 
concept relies on two 5G key enablers, Software Defined 
Network (SDN) that enables the decoupling of the 
infrastructure from the offered services, and Network 
Function Virtualization (NFV) that refers to the 
implementation of network functions in software running 
on general-purpose computing/storage platforms. In this 
case, the wireless virtualized business model mainly 
includes the Mobile Network Operators (MNOs) that 
provide their own infrastructure and/or radio resources to 
the Mobile Virtual Network Operators (MVNOs).9 
Specifically, the physical resources (e.g., infrastructure, 
spectrum) of a base station owned by an MNO are 
abstracted into isolated virtual resources, which are then 
leased and transparently shared among various MVNOs. 
So, it becomes clear that virtualization can reduce the 
capital expenditure (CapEx) and operational expenditure 
(OpEx) by minimizing the cost spent for new 
deployments and maintenance. Also, virtualization can 
achieve considerable improvement at resource utilization 
and quality of service, by efficiently meeting the dynamic 
service requirements triggered by the customers of 
different MVNOs. 
Several spectrum sharing schemes have been 
recommended to enhance the spectrum efficiency by 
allowing utilization of unused or underutilized spectrum 
temporally and geographically.10 However, these schemes 
actually involve not only spectrum sharing but also 
economic transactions between various parties, thus 
introducing spectrum trading. By definition, spectrum 
trading is the mechanism of buying and selling the rights 
of spectrum frequencies.11 The crucial benefits of 
spectrum trading are that the spectrum owners can make 
more money by selling their unutilized spectrum 
frequencies. Also, spectrum leasers can gain temporal but 
guaranteed spectrum access to serve their particular 
needs.1 It actually gives them the opportunity to provide 
wireless services in a better way and develop 
economically, and creates new business opportunities. In 
fact, over the past years, the traditional market dominated 
by MNOs with dedicated spectrum has left its place to the 
spectrum trading market, where MVNOs have become 
strong players by utilizing unused spectrum. Thus, they 
get the chance to bring their own featured services, 
support their traffic demands, and finally attract greater 
number of customers.9 
However, the parties involved (i.e., MNOs and 
MVNOs) are self-interested. In fact, both parties act 
selfishly, MNOs want to gain more revenues for certain 
bandwidth, MVNOs want to gain more bandwidth with 
certain cost, but they finally proceed in exchanging this 
kind of goods. As a result, spectrum trading can generate 
both competition and cooperation between buyers and 
sellers. Thus, a significant challenge for virtualized 5G 
networks is the spectrum trading and how to efficiently 
allocate the available spectrum resources in order both 
MNOs and MVNOs to be satisfied.12 
This paper concentrates on the topic of spectrum 
management and trading in virtualized 5G networks and 
how matching theory enables us to resolve this. The 
related work is thoroughly studied in Section II. Then, in 
Section III, the virtualized network model in the spectrum 
trading market along with the proposed matching 
algorithm are defined. Also, in Section IV and Section V, 
the simulation results of the matching performance at 
various different scenarios are presented for the proposed 
and enhanced version of the utility functions, respectively. 
Finally, in Section VI, the conclusions of our paper are 
demonstrated and some possible future work is suggested. 
II.   RELATED WORK 
The resource allocation problem in virtualized 
networks, i.e., how to assign resources to different 
slices,13 has been extensively studied and various 
solutions have been proposed. VMWare, for instance, has 
developed a network virtualization platform (NVP) 14 as a 
complete network virtualization solution that allows the 
creation of independent virtual networks for multi-tenant 
networks. Spectrum virtualization can be implemented by 
sharing the RF front end and antenna of the base station,15 
where the radio is flexibly sliced into multiple slices, each 
operating on different frequencies. However, the most 
usual approach to enable spectrum virtualization is to let 
each MVNO have its own customized scheduler over its 
slice. Then, the frame scheduler’s modification is done in 
order to assign Physical Resource Blocks (PRBs) to the 
slices in a dynamic manner at equal time intervals.16, 17, 18 
Thus, a hypervisor is added on the top of the physical 
layer of the base station and is responsible for virtualizing 
the base station and the spectrum as well. In this way, each 
MVNO will only get its required share of the PRBs and 
less waste of resources will occur.19 Also, another 
approach 20 adopts a high-level strategy by proposing a 
mechanism that schedules the resources between slices at 
the MAC layer or Network layer. In this work, the authors 
define the Network Virtualization Substrate (NVS), 
which is a substrate on BSs, by integrating virtualization 
into the WiMAX base station uplink/downlink scheduler 
software.  
However, when economic transactions take place on 
top of the spectrum allocation scenarios, then spectrum 
trading dominates, as described in Section I. Presently, 
different approaches have been adopted to cope with the 
spectrum trading problem, like game theory, auction 
theory, and market equilibrium.21  
Game theory includes competition or cooperation 
among multiple sellers and buyers to reach Nash 
equilibrium solution, which optimizes the payoff of all the 
players. On this point, a bankruptcy game was suggested 
for dynamic wireless resource allocation among multiple 
operators.22 Nevertheless, not all solutions converge to an 
equilibrium. Moreover, when huge number of players are 
involved, communication overhead can be a critical issue 
in game theory. Also, the high computational complexity 
of game theory, can be one more significant flaw.1 
Auction is the most well-known approach for trading 
in real world markets. In an auction, buyers submit their 
bids to the seller and the spectrum is sold to the buyer with 
the highest bid. In this way, the seller maximizes its profit 
and the auction ends. On this matter, an auction-based 
spectrum trading approach is applied to maximize both 
the total buyer’s satisfaction and the seller’s profit.23 
Specifically, the shared used model and the risk of 
imperfect spectrum sensing are considered in order to 
derive an expression that optimizes the sensing time (i.e., 
the time that the base station needs in order to identify 
spectrum opportunities, thus avoiding to make 
interferences with other base stations). Also, a 
hierarchical auction mechanism composed of two 
hierarchical auction models (i.e., a single-seller multiple-
buyer model and an extended multiple-seller multiple-
buyer model) has been designed.12 However, auctions 
may not be appropriate for dynamic and short-term 
frequency assignment, since they may require many 
repetitions to reach a stable solution.1 
Market equilibrium is the condition when the supply 
of a product is equal to the demand of this product. By 
relying only on supply and demand, market equilibrium 
model can be easily implemented compared to auction 
and game theoretic spectrum trading models that are much 
more difficult to realize.1 However, sellers and buyers do 
not directly exchange information among each other. 
Sellers only communicate with buyers in order to set the 
equilibrium price that brings supply and demand into 
balance and enables the exchange to take place, thus 
resulting in lower communication overhead. 
Though, the main wireless resource management 
problem can be also considered to be a matching problem 
between resources and users.24 In other words, a matching 
can typically be an assignment between resources and 
users in the resource management context. Thus, 
matching theory, born in economics and introduced in 
1962,25 has proved to be a hopeful method for wireless 
resource allocation, which can defeat the constraints of 
other mechanisms in terms of complexity, stability, 
optimality and efficiency. Each user and resource has a 
maximum allowed number of entities that can be matched 
with. The ultimate objective of the matching is to match 
resources and users in an optimal way, taking into account 
their particular targets. Either side (i.e., resource or user) 
forms a hierarchical preference table of the other side. The 
preference results from an objective utility function that 
measures the satisfaction accomplished by a specific 
resource-user matching. 
The most common classification of matching schemes 
is established on the maximum allowed number of 
matched players as follows: 
 One-to-one matching (O2OM): Each player of one set 
can be matched to at most one player of the opposite 
set. The most popular example is the stable marriage 
problem in which men and women are matched for 
marriage. 
 One-to-many matching (O2MM): Each player of one 
set can be matched to multiple players of the opposite 
set, while in the other set, every player has exactly one 
match. One known example is the college admissions 
problem in which a university can recruit multiple 
students, while a student can be matched to only one 
university. 
 Many-to-many matching (M2MM): Each player 
within each of the two sets can be matched to more 
than one player in the opposite set. One related 
example is the partnerships’ creation in peer-to-peer 
networks. 
Matching theory is beneficial for wireless resource 
management as it introduces suitable solutions in terms of 
stability and optimality, which precisely indicate different 
system objectives, and fast, efficient, inherently self-
organizing algorithmic implementations. Additionally, it 
does not demand a centralized controller as the players 
need not to monitor the preferences of other players. The 
convergence of the deferred acceptance algorithm 25 to a 
stable matching is guaranteed irrespective of the order of 
play and without any synchronization in time. Besides, 
matching has been apparently expressed as a simple, 
efficient, and practical solution framework, which settles 
the order among self-interested players in the market. 
Finally, it is applicable to complex networking problems 
as well, instead of trying to carry out any conventional 
optimization or game-theoretic approaches.26  
However, most of the references in literature refer to 
the user-cell association 27 and spectrum sharing process 
in cognitive radio networks,28 using only O2OM and 
O2MM models. Furthermore, the matching problem 
between MNOs and MVNOs in the wireless virtualization 
field and its efficiency on the spectrum trading market 
have not been extensively studied yet. A few research 
works use the concept of matching for the analysis of 
wireless communication networks,29,30 but they just 
analyze the simplified case of the O2MM model. Though, 
in the real world, MVNOs can cooperate with one or more 
MNOs. So far, M2MM models have been applied only in 
research works of different fields such as biology,31 
economic sciences,32 object recognition,33 caching.34 A 
considerable implementation of matching theory for 
engineering 26 is also provided, but it does not clearly 
investigate the challenges of future wireless systems.   
We have already presented the first research work that 
proposes the more complicated M2MM scheme for 
spectrum trading in virtualized 5G networks,35 where one 
MNO can form a partnership with multiple MVNOs and 
one MVNO can form a partnership with multiple MNOs. 
We go a step further, and this paper presents an extension 
of that preliminary evaluation,35 thus providing a 
complete evaluation on the M2MM scheme for spectrum 
trading in virtualized 5G networks, since: 
 It clarifies how SDN and NFV, as 5G enabler 
technologies, build the base where new 5G business 
models will grow. Resource virtualization is set as 
prerequisite in both research works, however, only in 
this research work, we obtain a list of such existing 
implementations. 
 It analyzes in more detail how matching theory could 
be applied in the wireless resource management. In 
particular, we describe why matching theory 
outperforms the other applied techniques especially in 
spectrum trading scenarios. 
 It proposes an enhanced version of the utility function. 
More specifically, this results in matching between 
MNO and MVNO requests based on the minimum 
possible amount of unsatisfied requests from both 
entities, and not based on the close bandwidth and 
price values. 
 It implements more real assumptions in the 
initialization step of the matching scheme algorithm. 
In our first research work,35 all bandwidth and price 
requests per entity had the same value. However, this 
is a special case that does not correspond to reality. In 
our current research work, the relevant requests differ 
from each other according to the various requirements 
or availability offers from the MVNOs and MNOs, 
respectively. Indeed, these assumptions make this 
scenario not only real, but also more general and 
difficult to satisfy both MNOs’ and MVNOs’ 
restrictions. 
 It examines different evaluation aspects regarding 
scalability scenarios and the impact of the weighting 
factors on the efficient resource allocation.  First, we 
increase the number of MVNOs to the greatest number 
in a European country and check the performance of 
our matching algorithm in extreme scenarios. Second, 
we study the influence of the weighting vectors to the 
performance of the proposed matching scheme. 
Actually, they enable us to put different emphasis in 
different parameters, i.e., price, bandwidth, reputation, 
quality of service, according to the strategy plan. 
III. MATCHING THEORY 
A. Trading Market Nework Model 
MNOs and MVNOs are regarded to be the predominant 
players in this model: 
 MNOs are the traditional mobile network operators, 
which own (such as infrastructure providers) or control 
all the resources (i.e., wireless network infrastructure, 
radio spectrum) required to provide communication 
services to customers, and also may be interested in 
selling their resources in the market. 
 MVNOs are virtual mobile network operators and play 
the role of the new market entrants, which do not own 
wireless network infrastructure and radio spectrum, but 
they request this kind of resources to satisfy their own 
customers’ needs. More specifically, they lease MNOs’ 
resources and resell them in order to deliver 
communication services to customers. 
 
Figure 1.  System model under consideration. 
The M2MM problem between the set of MNOs and the 
set of MVNOs is investigated. The system model under 
consideration is presented in Fig. 1. In this way, MNO1 
could possibly form a partnership with MVNO1 and 
MVNO2, while MVNO1 and MVNO2 could additionally 
form partnerships with other MNOs, too. Therefore, 
MNOS are supplied with more economic benefits and 
MVNOs are given more accessing opportunities. It is 
considered that the total number of MNOs is I=4, while the 
total number of MVNOs is J=50. These correspond to the 
average numbers in Europe, considering the 
heterogeneous allocation of MNOs and MVNOs.36  
The initialization step for the trading market between 
these two entities includes the generation of the market 
demand and supply. Therefore, all MNOs should 
announce their available spectrum parts and relevant 
selling price. In turn, all MVNOs should announce the 
minimum spectrum part needed and relevant price capable 
of paying to lease it. 
Let MNO = {1, 2, 3, …, I} be the set of I participating 
MNOs and MVNO = {1, 2, 3, …, J} be the set of J 
participating MVNOs. 
The matching between MNOs and MVNOs is executed 
using the extension of the deferred acceptance algorithm 25 
for the M2MM case. This means that a MNO can form a 
partnership with at most N different MVNOs, where N 
equals to MNO’s capacity size, i.e., how many available 
bandwidth sets each MNO can sell to the market. This also 
means that a MVNO can form a partnership with at most 
M different MNOs, where M equals to MVNO’s request 
size, i.e., how many bandwidth sets each MVNO can buy 
from the market. In our case, where the fixed total number 
of MNOs and MVNOs is I=4 and J=50, respectively, the 
variable values of N and M have been set to 25 and 2, 
respectively. These values are carefully selected because 
they result in 𝐼 × 𝑁 = 100 total available bandwidth sets 
ready to sell from the MNOs’ side and 𝐽 × 𝑀 =100 total 
required bandwidth sets ready to buy from the MVNOs’ 
side. Those variable values of N and M could have also 
been set to 50 and 4, respectively, thus resulting in total 
200 bandwidth sets.  Those variable values of N and M 
could have also been set to 100 and 8, thus resulting in total 
400 bandwidth sets, and so on. However, the combination 
of values, which yields to the smallest possible number of 
bandwidth sets (i.e., 100), was selected. Since the supply-
demand balance condition is fulfilled, the complete 
matching of two sets is achievable. 
Let Supply = {1, 2, 3, …, N} be the set of N=25 requests 
(i.e., available bandwidth sets to sell) from each MNO and 
Demand = {1, …, M} be the set of M=2 requests (i.e., 
bandwidth sets willing to buy) from each MVNO. 
Furthermore, the preference lists of both sets should be 
strict (i.e., no indifference), if the complete matching is 
desired to be successful as well. Therefore, both MNOs 
and MVNOs, set their preference list consisting of the 
ranking order list of the total opposite set of MVNOs or 
MNOs, respectively. So, the output of the matching game 
between MNOs and MVNOs ends up to be a complete and 
successful matching. 
In this work, we propose the formulas of the utility 
functions 𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝐼 × 𝑁, 𝐽 × 𝑀)  and 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝐽 × 𝑀, 𝐼 ×
𝑁) that will result in the creation of the preference lists of 
all requests from MNOs and MVNOs, respectively. These 
utility functions should consist of some specific 
parameters that each entity considers important to take into 
account for the creation of its own preference list. 
1) Mobile Network Operators: Each MNO decides to 
advertise its available spectrum to lease and the relevant 
selling price, i.e., the minimum revenue that a MNO 
pursues to gain. Both the bandwidth (BW) and price (PR) 
level are defined by an integer that follows the uniform 
distribution in the range [1,5]. 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) = 𝑈(1,5)    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) = 𝑈(1,5)    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
The MNOs’ reputation (REP) to the MVNOs and their 
Quality of Service (QoS) provided to MVNOs’ customers 
could also be employed as two more parameters to 
characterize MNOs. Both the REP and QoS level are 
defined by an integer that follows the uniform distribution 
in the range [1,3]. 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) = 𝑈(1,3)    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) = 𝑈(1,3)    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
2) Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Each MVNO 
decides to advertise its minimum amount of spectrum they 
need and the price capable of paying to lease it. Both the 
BW and PR levels are defined by an integer that follows 
the uniform distribution in the range [1,5].  
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) = 𝑈(1,5)  
∀ 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) = 𝑈(1,5)     
∀ 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
The MVNOs’ reputation to the MNOs could also be 
employed as one more parameter to characterize MVNOs. 
The REP level is defined by an integer that follows the 
uniform distribution in the range [1,3]. 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑈(1,3)    ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
Note that the BW and PR levels are assumed to be in 
the range of [1,5], since bandwidth and price are primary 
and easily countable parameters of the utility function, and 
also their range must be big enough to reflect the big 
variety of the relevant requests. Additionally, the REP and 
QoS levels are assumed to be in the range of [1,3], since 
reputation and quality of service are secondary and not 
easily countable parameters of the utility function, and also 
their range should just reflect a simple satisfaction rate 
(e.g. bad, medium, good).   
So far, there were adequately described the parameters 
that will selectively compose the utility functions 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝐼 × 𝑁, 𝐽 × 𝑀)  and 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝐽 × 𝑀, 𝐼 × 𝑁) . 
However, the utility function should clearly reflect the 
preferences of MNOs and MVNOs. Therefore, a 
weighting vector could be used in the utility functions’ 
formula and efficiently characterize the significance status 
of the specific utility functions’ parameters. In this way, 
each entity takes the opportunity to build its own game 
plan by choosing the most suitable weighting vector. The 
weighting vectors of the MNOs and MVNOs are shown in 
detail below. Also, the element values of these weighting 
vectors are related with each other according to the 
Equations (1) and (2): 
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 = [ 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 , 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 ,  𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 ] 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 + 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 = 1 (1) 
where 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊  concerns the MNO’s weight for the 
MVNO’s minimum amount of bandwidth demand, 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 concerns the MNO’s weight for the MVNO’s 
price capable of paying to lease the bandwidth, and 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 concerns the MNO’s weight for the MVNO’s 
reputation. 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 = [𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊, 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 , 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 ,𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃] 
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 = 1  (2) 
where 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊  concerns the MVNO’s weight for the 
MNO’s bandwidth supply, 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅  concerns the 
MVNO’s weight for the MNO’s selling price, 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 
concerns the MVNO’s weight for the MNO’s received 
quality of service, and 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 concerns the MVNO’s 
weight for the MNO’s reputation.
B. Matching Schemes 
In our work, in the first stage, we propose the use of the 
M2MM scheme for the request matching among MNOs 
and MVNOs. In the second stage, we propose the formula 
of the utility functions based on which the MNOs and 
MVNOs will create their own preference lists. Thus, the 
proposed M2MM algorithm with utility-based preferences 
is presented in the following. 
Many-to-many matching algorithm (M2MM)                     
with utility-based preferences 
Step 1 (Initialization): 
 Each MNO announces its available spectrum to 
lease, 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛), and relevant selling 
price, 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛), for all N available sets. Each 
MNO also maintains a table declaring the 
reputation level of the MVNOs. 
 Each MVNO announces its minimum amount of 
spectrum needed, 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚), and price 
capable of paying to lease it, 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚), for all 
M required sets. Each MVNO also maintains a 
table declaring the reputation level of the MNOs 
and the quality of service level granted by the 
MNOs (in line with the received signal strength). 
Step 2 (Preference list): 
 For each n ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 request per MNO, a separate 
preference list for all the MVNOs’ requests is 
constructed according to the utility function 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝐼 × 𝑁, 𝐽 × 𝑀).  
 For each m ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  request per MVNO, a 
separate preference list for all the MNOs’ requests 
is constructed according to the utility function 
𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝐽 × 𝑀, 𝐼 × 𝑁).  
Step 3 (Matching mechanism): 
 For each m ∈ 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑  request per MVNO, the 
MVNO checks its preference list and makes a 
proposal to the highest rated MNO request. 
 Each MNO accepts all the MVNO requests until 
the MNO’s match list size reaches its capacity N.  
 After this limit, the MNO accepts the N highest 
rated MVNO requests according to its preference 
list and rejects the others. 
 If any MVNO request gets rejected, then the related 
MVNO checks its preference list again and makes 
a proposal to the next highest rated MNO request, 
until this MVNO request finds a match. 
 The end of the algorithm comes when every 
MVNO request has matched with a MNO request. 
It should be emphasized that MVNOs make the 
proposal for partnership. This means that MNOs select 
their match according to their own preference list. This 
consideration actually implies that MVNOs will probably 
have better matching, i.e., a matching closer to their own 
preferences, than MNOs will. 
For the evaluation of the utility-based preferences 
M2MM scheme, it is compared with various schemes: 
1. M2MM scheme with random-based preferences, 
where the preference lists of both MNOs and 
MVNOs are created in random way. That is, only 
Step 2 is modified. 
2. O2MM scheme with utility-based preferences, 
where one MNO can associate with multiple 
MVNOs, but one MVNO can only associate with 
one MNO. That is, only one of the requests per 
MVNO gets matched. As a result, probably a large 
number of MNO and MVNO requests remains 
unmatched.  
3. Non—multi-tenancy scheme, where MNOs and 
MVNOs do not collaborate with each other. Thus, 
unutilized spectrum remains unavailable because 
spectrum sharing is not performed. That is, all 
requests from MNOs and MVNOs remain 
unmatched. 
We study the performance of our recommended 
M2MM scheme with utility-based preferences by 
establishing a MATLAB simulation model. More 
specifically, this is a self-made simulation tool that extends 
the absolutely trusted and stable O2OM algorithm (i.e., 
deferred acceptance algorithm) to the M2MM algorithm. 
We have examined a virtualized 5G network with I=4 
MNOs of N=25 and J=50 MVNOs of M=2, as introduced 
in Section III.A. Moreover, if we consider 3 daily spectrum 
trading interactions on average, then the yearly spectrum 
trading interactions result in 1080 totally (3 × 30 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ×
12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 = 1080). Finally, taking into account that the 
virtualization concept can be applied (as discussed in 
Section II), the implementation of our proposed matching 
algorithm is realistic and can be easily integrated as 
software (e.g., on a virtual base station). This real 
implementation capability gives our proposal more power 
to compete with any other relevant proposals, and to 
become one of the main operational procedures of the 5G 
virtualized business model. 
IV. PROPOSED UTILITY FUNCTION 
The ultimate goal of the M2MM scheme with utility-
based preferences is to achieve the best possible matching 
that satisfies MNOs and MVNOs at the same time. 
However, both sides are self-interested. On the one hand, 
a MNO wishes to get the most suitable MVNOs to host, 
i.e., the MVNOs that can pay such price that maximizes 
MNO’s revenues. On the other hand, a MVNO wishes to 
get the most suitable MNOs to be hosted, i.e., the MNOs 
that can grant such amount of bandwidth that maximizes 
MVNO’s bandwidth reserve to meet its customers’ 
requirements. Therefore, each entity aims to meet its ideal 
matching pair by maximizing its own utility function. In 
other terms, the utility function should efficiently represent 
the preferences of each entity. 
A. Utility function formula  
The maximum utility functions of the MNOs and 
MVNOs are given in the Equations (3) and (4), 
respectively: 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 5𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 + 3𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 
 (3) 
𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 5𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 5𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 + 3𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 +
                                   3𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆  (4) 
where number five corresponds to the biggest grade that 
the bandwidth or price could be set, and number three 
corresponds to the biggest grade that reputation or quality 
of service could be set (cf. Section III.A). 
Consequently, the proposed utility function for the 
MNOs is defined in the Equation (5) as: 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖 × 𝑛, 𝑗 × 𝑚) 
= |𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 (5 + 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)) 
+  𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅  (5 + 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)
− 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)) 
+ 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃  𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗)
−  𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑥| 
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝.  (5) 
where 𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) goes to zero when both differences 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)  and 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) −
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) go to zero, and 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) reaches the 
peak, i.e., three. This implies that a MNO request 
preferably matches with a MVNO request having 
bandwidth-price sets close to its own ones and the best 
possible reputation. 
Accordingly, the proposed utility function for the 
MVNOs is defined below in the Equation (6) as: 
𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗 × 𝑚, 𝑖 × 𝑛) 
= |𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 (5 + 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)) 
+  𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 (5 + 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)
− 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)) 
+ 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)
+ 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)
− 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂𝑚𝑎𝑥|  
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝.  (6) 
where 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) goes to zero when both differences 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)  and 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖. 𝑛) −
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗. 𝑚)  go to zero, and both 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)  and 
𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) reach the peak, i.e., three. This implies that 
a MVNO request preferably matches with a MNO request 
having bandwidth-price sets close to its own ones and the 
best possible reputation and quality of service. 
As a result, the lower the utility function value the 
better the preference of one entity’s request for the 
matching entity’s request. 
Finally, it is worth to underline that the utility function 
value is calculated to set the preference list and evaluate 
the matching performance: 
 The utility function value is computed to set the 
preference list only for the following schemes: 
M2MM scheme with utility-based preferences, 
O2MM scheme with utility-based preferences. In 
the M2MM scheme with random-based 
preferences, the preference list is calculated 
randomly. In the non—multi-tenancy scheme, no 
preference list is calculated at all. 
 The utility function value is computed to evaluate 
the performance for all schemes. However, we 
need to clarify that in the cases that there is partial 
or complete unmatching, i.e., O2MM scheme with 
utility-based preferences and non—multi-tenancy 
scheme, respectively, it is assumed that: 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) =
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) = 0   
       ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. in Eq. (5) 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) = 𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)
= 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) = 0  
         ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. in Eq. (6)  
B. Same bandwidth and price request values 
Initially, for the sake of less complexity, it is assumed 
the special case where all bandwidth requests per MNO 
have the same value and all price requests per MNO have 
the same value as well. Essentially, our previous research 
work 35 was completely based on this assumption for the 
MNOs, and it is first described in the following: 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 1) = 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 2) = ⋯ = 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)  
∀ 𝑖, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 1) = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 2) = ⋯ = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) 
∀ 𝑖, 𝑛 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
Accordingly, our previous research work 35 was 
completely based on a similar assumption for the 
MVNOs, and it is first described in the following: 
𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 1) = 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 2) = ⋯ = 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)  
∀ 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 1) = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 2) = ⋯ = 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) 
∀ 𝑗, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
Obviously, the MNOs put more emphasis on the price 
parameter, since their target is to increase their earnings. 
For the MNOs, the bandwidth and the reputation 
parameter come afterwards. On the contrary, the MVNOs 
put more emphasis on the bandwidth parameter, since their 
target is to acquire access to the licensed spectrum. For the 
MVNOs, the quality of service, price and reputation 
parameter come afterwards. So, the weighting vectors, 
assumed in the previous research work,35 are the 
following: 
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 = [0.3 , 0.5 , 0.2] 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 = [0.4 , 0.2 ,0.3 , 0.1] 
Then, the performance of the four different schemes, 
as mentioned in Section III.B, was evaluated 35 by 
calculating the utility function for each one of them. More 
specifically, the value of the utility function, or just utility, 
represents the average utility of a request for all requests 
of one specific entity, for all same type of entities, for 
1080 iterations.  
Therefore, the average utilities of a MNO and MVNO 
request were estimated in the four different schemes.35 
The results showed that the M2MM scheme with utility-
based preferences apparently outperformed over the rest 
of the schemes. This matching scheme improved the 
spectrum utilization and also enhanced the welfare of each 
entity (i.e., revenues for MNOs and bandwidth for 
MVNOs) involved in the spectrum trading. 
Additionally, the average partial utilities of a MNO 
and MVNO request were estimated in the four different 
schemes.35 It was shown that the matching performance 
was getting better when the number of parameters in the 
utility function was growing. 
Then, it was assumed 35 that the MNO request is 
satisfied when its matching MVNO request pays same or 
more money than the announced selling price, otherwise 
the MNO request is unsatisfied. Accordingly, the MVNO 
request is satisfied when its matching MNO request grants 
same or more spectrum than the announced requesting 
amount of spectrum, otherwise the MVNO request is 
unsatisfied. Thus, the satisfaction of a matching pair, 
which is the union of the aforementioned conditions, is 
defined as follows: 
 If 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 ≥ 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂  and 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 , 
then both requests of the matching pair are 
satisfied. 
 If 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 < 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂  and 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂 > 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 , 
then both requests of the matching pair are 
unsatisfied. 
 In any other case, one request of the matching pair 
is satisfied and one is unsatisfied. 
Therefore, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 demonstrate the average 
number of satisfied and unsatisfied requests from 
individual entities and matching pairs, respectively, over 
the M2MM scheme with utility-based preferences and the 
M2MM scheme with random-based preferences. Both 
figures appear in our previous research work 35 and are 
reproduced in this paper so that the comparison between 
the different evaluation aspects can be more readable and 
comprehensible.  
Firstly, in Fig. 2, it can be viewed that the average 
number of satisfied requests from individual MNOs or 
MVNOs is bigger than the number of unsatisfied ones in 
both M2MM schemes, i.e., the M2MM scheme with 
utility-based preferences (U) and the M2MM scheme with 
random-based preferences (R). Besides, after comparing 
these two M2MM schemes, there is not any substantial 
difference in their performance. 
 
Figure 2.  Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied individual  
requests (same request values).35 
Secondly, in Fig. 3, it can be noticed that the average 
number of matching pair requests, that are satisfied, has a 
considerable superiority in the utility-based preferences 
M2MM scheme over the random-based preferences 
M2MM scheme. However, the number of satisfied 
matching pair requests, i.e., 45%, is less than the number 
of total unsatisfied ones, i.e., 55%, which drives the need 
for making severe changes in the proposed utility function 
in order to effectively defeat this weakness. 
 
Figure 3.  Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied matching pair  
requests (same request values).35 
C. Impact of weighting factors 
In this section, we study the influence of the weighting 
vectors 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂  and 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂  to the performance of the 
proposed utility-based preferences M2MM scheme.35 This 
analysis is considered to be a new contribution of this 
research work. As mentioned in Section IV.B, the MNOs 
put more emphasis on the price parameter, since their 
target is to increase their earnings, while the MVNOs put 
more emphasis on the bandwidth parameter, since their 
target is to acquire access to the licensed spectrum. Thus, 
we focus our results on two main categories: 
 First category: Varying the price weight 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅  of the weighting vector 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂  from 
0.1 to 0.9, by keeping the remaining weights 
equally distributed. The reference scenario, 
where  𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 = [0.3, 0.5, 0.2] , and the scenario 
when all weights have the same value, i.e., 
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂 = [0.33, 0.33, 0.33],  are also included. 
The weighting vector 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 remains unchanged.  
 Second category: Varying the bandwidth weight 
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊  of the weighting vector 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂  from 
0.1 to 0.9, by keeping the remaining weights 
equally distributed. The reference scenario, 
where  𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 = [0.4, 0.2, 0.3, 0.1] , and the 
scenario when all weights have the same value 
i.e., 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂 = [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25],  are also 
included. The weighting vector 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂  remains 
unchanged. 
At first, for the first category, Fig. 4 depicts the 
average utilities of a MNO and MVNO request with 
varying MNO price weight for our proposed scheme, i.e., 
M2MM scheme with utility-based preferences. It can be 
confirmed graphically that the utility of a MVNO request 
remains almost stable as its utility function is not affected, 
but the utility of a MNO request normally increases as its 
main weight (price) increases. After taking into 
consideration that the lower the utility function value the 
better the preference of one entity’s request for the 
matching entity’s request, as mentioned in Section IV.A, 
then it seems to be that 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.2 would probably 
be the best choice for high utility function performance 
(for both MNOs and MVNOs). However, Fig. 5 and Fig. 
6, which present the average number of satisfied 
individual requests and satisfied/unsatisfied matching pair 
requests, respectively, with varying MNO price weight for 
our proposed scheme, prove that 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.2 would 
not really be the best choice. In Fig. 5, it is observed that 
for 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.2, the difference between the numbers 
of satisfied MVNO and MNO requests is the largest 
possible. Only for the reference scenario and 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 
0.5, there is a balance between the numbers of satisfied 
MNO and MVNO requests. Note that in the reference 
scenario, 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅  is equal to 0.5, too, as mentioned in 
Section IV.B. Moreover, in Fig. 6, it is shown that the 
number of both satisfied matching pair requests can be 
large for several scenarios, e.g. reference scenario 
(𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.5) and 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.2, 0.3, 0.33, 0.4, 0.7. 
Thus, taking into account all these figure results, it is 
confirmed that our assumption, or reference choice, for 
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 = 0.5 does make sense, does achieve fairness 
between MNO and MVNO entities and does show high 
performance in terms of both entities’ satisfaction. Then, 
following the same reasoning for varying the MVNO 
bandwidth weight, we obtain that the best choice is the 
reference choice with 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 = 0.4. We do not include 
the specific analysis since it follows the same reasoning 
as for the MNO price weight, and due to space constraints. 
 
Figure 4.  Average utility of a MNO/MVNO request vs. 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 
for our proposed scheme (same request values). 
 
Figure 5.  Average number of satisfied individual requests vs.  
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 for our proposed scheme (same request values). 
 
Figure 6.  Average number of satisfied/unsatisfied matching pair                                                           
requests vs. 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 for our proposed scheme (same request   
values). 
D. Scalability evaluation 
The results in our previous research work 35 
investigated the performance of the proposed utility-based 
preferences M2MM scheme by considering a virtualized 
5G network with I=4 MNOs of N=25 and J=50 MVNOs 
of M=2, as mentioned in Section III.A. Now, in order to 
have a general view with regard to scalability issues of our 
proposal, we extend our previous research work’s results 
by increasing the number of MVNOs to 130, which is 
almost the total number of MVNOs in Germany 36 and the 
greatest number in a European country. Thus, in turn, in 
order to fulfill the supply-demand balance condition, 
which is mandatory for the complete matching of two sets, 
as mentioned in Section III.A, we now consider a 
virtualized 5G network with I=4 MNOs of N=65 and 
J=130 MVNOs of M=2. 
The results showed that the proposed M2MM scheme 
with utility-based preferences is fully scalable to the 
number of MVNOs and does not affect the matching 
efficiency, as its performance remains the same compared 
with the results in our previous research work.35  
E. Different bandwidth and price request values 
In our previous research work,35 as well as in Section 
IV.B, the calculation of the utility functions 𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖 ×
𝑛, 𝑗 × 𝑚) and 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗 × 𝑚, 𝑖 × 𝑛) was much simplified 
after the assumptions that all bandwidth requests per 
entity have the same value and all price requests per entity 
have the same value as well. That analysis allowed us to 
validate the utility function and to compare our matching 
approach with others. However, this is not the general 
case. In general, the relevant requests differ to each other 
according to the various requirements from the MVNOs 
or availability offers from the MNOs. Also, it is more 
difficult to satisfy both MNOs and MVNOs when having 
different relevant requests, as the variation among the 
requests is not limited under any condition. The following 
analysis is considered to be a new contribution of this 
research work. 
At first, the difference between these two cases can be 
expressed in terms of time complexity: 
 In the special case (same request values scenario), 
in order to set the preference lists, the utility 
function for all MNOs or MVNOs needs to be 
calculated (𝐼 × 𝐽)  times. This happens because 
all the requests of one MNO are the same and, 
accordingly, all the requests of one MVNO are 
the same. As a result, each MNO calculates the 
utility function 𝐽 times, totally (𝐼 × 𝐽) times for 
all MNOs (I MNOs). In the same way, each 
MVNO calculates the utility function I times, i.e., 
(𝐼 × 𝐽) times for all MVNOs (J MVNOs). 
 In the general case (different requests scenario), 
in order to set the preference lists, the utility 
function for all MNOs or MVNOs needs to be 
calculated (𝐼 × 𝑁 × 𝐽 × 𝑀) times. This happens 
because all the requests of one MNO are different 
(N requests per MNO) and, accordingly, all the 
requests of one MVNO are different (M requests 
per MVNO). As a result, each MNO calculates 
the utility function (𝑁 × 𝐽 × 𝑀) times, totally 
(𝐼 × 𝑁 × 𝐽 × 𝑀) times for all MNOs (I MNOs). 
In the same way, each MVNO calculates the 
utility function (𝐼 × 𝑁 × 𝑀) times, i.e., (𝐼 × 𝑁 ×
𝐽 × 𝑀) times for all MVNOs (J MVNOs). 
For example, in this work, given that I=4, J=50, N=25 
and M=2, utility has to be calculated 200 times in the 
special case and 10.000 times in the general case, i.e., 50 
times more. Also, taking into account that we assumed the 
number of yearly interactions is 1.080 (as mentioned in 
Section III.B), then the time needed to calculate this 
general case increases even more. In particular, utility has 
to be calculated 200×1.080=216.000 times in the special 
case and 10.000×1.080=10.800.000 times in the general 
case, which is an extremely demanding task.
Secondly, the difference between these two cases can 
be expressed in terms of performance. Thus, the 
performance of the four different schemes, as mentioned 
in Section III.B, is evaluated by calculating the utility 
function for each one of them, now for the different 
requests scenario. Then, these utilities are compared with 
the relevant utilities of the same requests scenario, which 
was simulated in our previous research work.35  
More specifically, Fig. 7(a) illustrates the average 
utility of a MNO request in the four different schemes for 
the new scenario with different request values. As 
explained in Section IV.A, the lower the utility function 
value the better the preference of one entity’s request for 
the matching entity’s request. Thus, compared with the 
results in our previous research work (same request 
values),35 it can be seen that our proposed scheme is the 
only one among the four schemes that has performance 
improvement. In fact, the average utility of a MNO 
request in the utility-based preferences M2MM scheme is 
0.75 for the scenario with same request values, and 0.25 
for the scenario with different request values.   
Additionally, the same behavior is observed when Fig. 
7(b), which presents the average utility of a MVNO 
request in the four different schemes for the new scenario 
with different request values, is compared with the results 
in our previous research work (same request values).35 
Figure 7.  Average utility of a MNO (a) and MVNO (b) request in four different schemes (different request values). 
 
That means, when the new scenario with different request 
values is implemented, each MVNO request has more 
possibilities to find a MNO request closer to its 
preferences to match, and reversely. 
Besides, Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 demonstrate the average 
number of satisfied and unsatisfied requests from 
individual entities and matching pairs, respectively, for the 
new scenario with different request values. In Fig. 8, 
compared with relevant Fig. 2, it becomes obvious that the 
average number of satisfied individual requests increases. 
Accordingly, the average number of unsatisfied individual 
requests decreases, for the utility-based preferences 
M2MM scheme (U). In particular, the satisfied MNO 
requests increase from 62% to 72%, while the unsatisfied 
MVNO requests decrease from 38% to 30%. On the other 
hand, for the M2MM scheme with random-based 
preferences (R), the average number of satisfied and 
unsatisfied individual requests remains the same for both 
types of requests. 
 
Figure 8.  Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied individual 
requests (different request values). 
 
Figure 9.  Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied matching pair 
requests (different request values). 
Finally, in Fig. 9, compared with relevant Fig. 3 (same 
request values), it can be seen that the average number of 
satisfied matching pair requests is 67% for the new 
scenario with different request values, and only 45% for 
the previous research work’s scenario with same request 
values, in the M2MM scheme with utility-based 
preferences. Additionally, the average number of 
matching pairs with one request satisfied and the other one 
unsatisfied reduces from 35% to 9%, but the average 
number of both unsatisfied matching pair requests 
increases from 20% to 24%. Again, for the M2MM 
scheme with random-based preferences, the performance 
remains the same for both scenarios. 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that our proposed 
utility-based preferences M2MM scheme contributes to 
more efficient spectrum trading in the scenario with 
different request values (general) than in the scenario with 
same request values (special). 
 
V. ENHANCED UTILITY FUNCTION 
After taking a more careful look at the proposed utility 
function of the MNOs and MVNOs in Section IV.A, it is 
concluded that it encourages the best matching between 
MNO and MVNO requests by relying on the minimum 
possible difference of bandwidth and price values between 
supply and demand. In other words, it becomes obvious 
that each entity’s request prefers to match with another 
entity’s request having close bandwidth and price values. 
Additionally, the results of Fig. 3 and Fig. 9, where the 
average number of both unsatisfied matching pair requests 
increases from 20% to 24%, have a negative impact to the 
utility function’s efficiency. These issues imply that the 
utility function should primarily result in matching 
between MNO and MVNO requests based on the 
minimum possible amount of unsatisfied requests from 
both entities. The following analysis is considered to be a 
new contribution of this research work.   
A. Enhanced utility function formula 
Thus, another version of the utility function should 
fulfill the aforementioned goal. The enhanced version of 
utility function for the MNOs is defined below in the 
Equation (7) as: 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖 × 𝑛, 𝑗 × 𝑚) = 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 (5 −
|𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)|) + 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 (1 +
𝑓(𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛))) +
𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗)   
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝.  (7) 
where 𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖 × 𝑛, 𝑗 × 𝑚) tends to increase when both 
differences 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)  and 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)  go to zero, and 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑗) reaches the peak, i.e., three. This implies 
that a MNO request preferably matches with a MVNO 
request having bandwidth request close to its own relevant 
one, price request equal to or larger than its own relevant 
one and the highest possible reputation. Note that in order 
to have same range values between the factors (5 −
|𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛)|) and (1 +
𝑓(𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛))) in Eq. (7), we follow 
the mapping in Table 1. 
The enhanced version of utility function for the 
MVNOs is defined below in the Equation (8) as: 
𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗 × 𝑚, 𝑖 × 𝑛) = 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 (1 +
𝑓(𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚))) + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅 (5 −
|𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)|) +
𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖) + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)  
  ∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. (8) 
where 𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗 × 𝑚, 𝑖 × 𝑛) tends to increase when both 
differences 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)  and 
𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)  go to zero, and both 
𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)  and 𝑄𝑂𝑆𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑖)  reach the peak, i.e., 
three. This implies that a MVNO request preferably 
matches with a MNO request having bandwidth request 
equal or larger than its own relevant one, price request 
close to its own relevant one, the highest possible 
reputation and quality of service. Note that in order to 
have same range values between the factors (1 +
𝑓(𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝐵𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)))  and (5 −
|𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖, 𝑛) − 𝑃𝑅𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗, 𝑚)|)  in Eq. (8), we follow 
the mapping in Table 1. 
x 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 
f(x) 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 
Table 1. Mapping values of specific factors 
As a result, the higher the utility function value the 
better the preference of one entity’s request for the 
matching entity’s request. 
Finally, as clarified in Section IV.A, the utility is 
calculated to set the preference list and evaluate the 
matching performance. However, in the cases that there is 
partial unmatching (i.e., O2MM scheme with utility-based 
preferences) or complete unmatching (i.e., non—multi-
tenancy scheme), the utility function is expressed 
differently. It is assumed that the utility functions have the 
minimum value in these cases: 
𝑈𝑀𝑁𝑂(𝑖 × 𝑛, 𝑗 × 𝑚)
= 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅
+ 𝑊𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 = 1 
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
𝑈𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂(𝑗 × 𝑚, 𝑖 × 𝑛)
= 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝐵𝑊 + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑃𝑅
+ 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑄𝑂𝑆 + 𝑊𝑀𝑁𝑂,𝑅𝐸𝑃 = 1 
∀ 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑛, 𝑚 ∈ 𝑀𝑁𝑂, 𝑀𝑉𝑁𝑂, 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦, 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝. 
B. Performance analysis 
Initially, for the enhanced utility function, the weight 
values, which are expressed in Section IV.B, remain the 
same as for the original utility function. Besides, a similar 
weight impact analysis has been done as with the original 
utility function, and draws the same conclusions, thus 
validating the reference weight scenario as a valid one. 
Then, as analytically described in Section IV.B for the 
original utility function, for the sake of less complexity, 
we initially assume the special case where all bandwidth 
requests per MNO/MVNO have the same value and all 
price requests per MNO/MVNO have the same value as 
well. The new average utilities of a MNO and a MVNO 
request in the four different schemes (enhanced utility 
function, same request values) are depicted in Fig. 10(a) 
and Fig. 10(b), respectively. Additionally, as described in 
Section IV.E, the general case is that the relevant requests 
differ to each other according to the various requirements 
from the MVNOs or availability offers from the MNOs. 
The new average utilities of a MNO and MVNO request 
in the four different schemes (enhanced utility function, 
different request values) are illustrated in Fig. 11(a) and 
Fig. 11(b), respectively. 
As explained in Section V.A, for the enhanced utility 
function, the higher the utility function value the better the 
preference of one entity’s request for the matching 
entity’s request. Therefore, like the original utility 
function, it can be seen once again that the cooperative 
schemes (i.e., M2MM and O2MM) show better 
performance than the non—multi-tenancy scheme. In 
turn, the utility-based preferences M2MM scheme 
outperforms all the other schemes. Additionally, like the 
original utility function, the new average partial utility of 
a MNO/MVNO request in the four different schemes 
(enhanced utility function, same request values), as 
presented at Fig. 12, shows again that the matching 
performance is getting better when the number of 
parameters in the utility function is growing. 
  
Figure 11.  Average utility of a MNO (a) and MVNO (b) request in four different schemes (enhanced utility function, different request values). 
 
Figure 12.  Average partial utility of a MNO (a) and MVNO (b) request in four different schemes (enhanced utility function, same request values). 
Figure 10.  Average utility of a MNO (a) and MVNO (b) request in four different schemes (enhanced utility function, same request values). 
 
Although Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 show generally that our 
proposed utility-based preferences M2MM scheme has a 
superior performance in terms of utility over the other 
schemes for the enhanced utility function, they do not 
prove if there is any performance improvement of this new 
enhanced version over the previous original one. The 
comparison between the two versions of utility function 
will be relied on the results related with the average 
number of satisfied/unsatisfied individual and matching 
pair requests, which are demonstrated in Fig. 13 and Fig. 
14, respectively.  
Firstly, in Fig. 13, compared with relevant Fig. 2 for the  
scenario of the original utility function with same request 
values, it can be observed that the new average number of 
satisfied individual requests increases. Accordingly, the 
new average number of unsatisfied individual requests 
decreases for the utility-based preferences M2MM scheme 
(U). In particular, the new satisfied MNO requests increase 
from 62% to 66%, while the new unsatisfied MVNO 
requests decrease from 38% to 33%. On the other hand, for 
the M2MM scheme with random-based preferences (R), 
the average number of satisfied and unsatisfied individual 
requests remains the same for both scenarios (original and 
enhanced utility function). 
Secondly, in Fig. 14, compared with relevant Fig. 3 for 
the case of the original utility function with same request 
values, it can be seen that the new average number of  
matching pair requests, that are satisfied, is 45% for both 
scenarios (original and enhanced utility function) in the 
M2MM scheme with utility-based preferences (U). 
Additionally, the new average number of both matching 
pair requests, which are unsatisfied, decreases from 20% 
to 12%. But the new average number of matching pairs 
with one request satisfied and the other one unsatisfied 
slightly increases from 35% to 42%. Again, for the 
M2MM scheme with random-based preferences (R), the 
performance remains the same for both scenarios (original 
and enhanced utility function). 
As a conclusion, it can be stated that our proposed 
utility-based preferences M2MM scheme and the 
enhanced utility function with same request values 
improve the matching performance by radically reducing 
the number of both matching pair requests that are 
unsatisfied. Also, the number of both matching pair 
requests, that are satisfied, remains the same compared 
with the original utility function with same request values.  
 
Figure 13. Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied individual 
requests (enhanced utility function, same request values). 
 
Figure 14. Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied matching pair 
requests (enhanced utility function, same request values). 
Besides, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 present the average 
number of satisfied and unsatisfied requests from 
individual entities and matching pairs, respectively, for the 
new scenario of the enhanced utility function with 
different request values.   
In Fig. 15, compared with relevant Fig. 13 for the 
scenario of the enhanced utility function with same request 
values, we make the same conclusions as for the original 
utility function, which is presented in Section IV.E. Again, 
in Fig. 15, compared with Fig. 8 for the original utility 
function with different request values, it becomes clear that 
the average number of satisfied individual requests 
increases and, accordingly,  the average number of 
unsatisfied individual requests decreases for the utility-
based preferences M2MM scheme (U). In particular, the 
satisfied MNO requests increase from 72% to 86%, while 
the unsatisfied MVNO requests decrease from 30% to 
13%. Also, for the M2MM scheme with random-based 
preferences (R), the average number of satisfied and 
unsatisfied individual requests remains the same for all 
scenarios. 
Then, in Fig. 16, compared with relevant Fig. 14 for the 
enhanced utility function with same request values, the 
same conclusions are drawn as for the original utility 
function, which is described in Section IV.E. Again, in Fig. 
16, compared with relevant Fig. 9 for the original utility 
function with different request values, it can be noticed 
that the average number of satisfied matching pair requests 
increases from 67% to 81% for the utility-based 
preferences M2MM scheme (U). Additionally, the average 
number of both unsatisfied matching pair requests is 
reduced from 24% to 9%, while the average number of 
matching pairs with one request satisfied and the other one 
unsatisfied increases a bit from 9% to 10%. Also, for the 
random-based preferences M2MM scheme (R), the 
performance remains the same for all scenarios. 
 
Figure 15. Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied individual 
requests (enhanced utility function, different request 
values). 
 
Figure 16. Average number of satisfied and unsatisfied matching pair 
requests (enhanced utility function, different request 
values). 
Finally, it can be stated that our proposed utility-based 
preferences M2MM scheme and the enhanced utility 
function with different request values improve the 
matching performance by dramatically reducing the 
number of both unsatisfied matching pair requests. Also, 
at the same time, they impressively increase the number 
of both satisfied matching pair requests compared with all 
other scenarios. Our proposal can match MNO and 
MVNO requests in such a way that both sides can get the 
maximum level of satisfaction in terms of matching pair 
preference. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This research work has introduced an M2MM scheme 
with utility-based preferences as a very suitable solution 
for the spectrum trading problem between the MNOs and 
the MVNOs of a virtualized 5G network. Indeed, a 
detailed description of this matching algorithm and two 
proposed versions of utility functions (original and 
enhanced) were provided. Our proposed scheme has been 
compared with the M2MM scheme with random-based 
preferences, the O2MM scheme with utility-based 
preferences and the non-multi-tenancy scheme. It is also 
evaluated for various system parameters and scenarios to 
investigate its performance with regard to scalability, 
strategy plan and generalization. Simulation results 
indicated that the utility-based preferences M2MM 
scheme leads to more efficient spectrum utilization and 
better matching performance for both MNOs and MVNOs 
as well. Thus, our research work achieved to resolve the 
spectrum trading problem in a way that both entities are 
satisfied, as mutually beneficial relations were created 
between MNOs and MVNOs. 
In future, we aim at putting also the end customers (i.e., 
subscribed users) into the game with MNOs and MVNOs. 
Thus, we will be able to evaluate their influence to the 
efficiency of the matching process. Specifically, the MNO 
is obliged to abstract the physical resources into virtual 
ones and allocate them to each MVNO. In turn, the MVNO 
manages the assignment of the slice resources to its end 
customers accordingly. To this extent, the end customers 
could actively set their own preference lists for MVNOs or 
passively affect the requests of MVNOs with their required 
customized services. This combination of perspectives 
could give us the opportunity to resolve previously 
unaddressed issues behind the development of an end-to-
end matching mechanism, which is appropriate to be 
served by virtualized 5G networks. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work has received funding from the European 
Union Horizon 2020-MCSA-ITN-2015 Innovative 
Training Networks (ITN) under grant agreement No 
675806 (5G-AuRA).  
REFERENCES 
1. M.R. Hassan, G.C. Karmakar, G. Kamruzzaman, B. Srinivasan, 
“Exclusive Use Spectrum Access Trading Models in Cognitive 
Radio Networks: A Survey”, IEEE Communications Surveys and 
Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 2192-2231, 2017. 
2. H. Kim, G. de Veciana, “Leveraging Dynamic Spare Capacity in 
Wireless Systems to Conserve Mobile Terminals’ Energy,” 
IEEE/ACM Trans.on Networking, vol. 18, pp. 802–815, 2010. 
3. M. Pan, M. Li, P. Li, Y. Fang, Spectrum Trading in Multi-hop 
Cognitive Radio Networks. Springer, 2015. 
4. E. Hossain, M. Hasan, “5G Cellular: Key Enabling Technologies 
and Research Challenges,” IEEE Instrumentation and 
Measurement Magazine, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 11-21, 2015. 
5. N. Al-Falahy, O. Y. Alani, “Technologies for 5G Networks: 
Challenges and Opportunities”, IT Professional, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 
12-20, 2017. 
6. P. Banelli, S. Buzzi, G. Colavolpe, A. Modenini, F. Rusek, and A. 
Ugolini, “Modulation Formats and Waveforms for 5G Networks: 
Who Will Be the Heir of OFDM?,” IEEE Signal Process. Mag., 
vol. 31, no. 11, pp. 80–93, 2014. 
7. NGMN Alliance, “Description of Network Slicing Concept,” 
NGMN 5G P1, Jan. 2016. 
8. Peter Rost, et al., “Benefits and Challenges of Virtualization in 
5G Radio Access Networks,” IEEE Communications Magazine, 
vol. 53, no. 12, pp. 75-82, Dec. 2015. 
9. C. Liang and F. R. Yu, “Wireless Network Virtualization: A 
Survey, some Research Issues and Challenges,” IEEE 
Communications Surveys and Tutorials, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 358-
380, 2014. 
10. C. Yang, J. Li, M. Guizani, A. Anpalagan, M. Elkashlan, 
“Advanced Spectrum Sharing in 5G Cognitive Heterogeneous 
Networks”, IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 23, no. 2, pp. 
94-101, 2016. 
11. C.E. Caicedo, M.B.H. Weiss, “The Viability of Spectrum Trading 
Markets”, IEEE Symp. on New Frontiers in Dynamic Spectrum 
(DySPAN), 2010. 
12. K. Zhu, E. Hossain, “Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a 
Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction”, IEEE Trans. on Mobile 
Computing, vol. 15, no. 10, pp. 2640-2654, 2015. 
13. M. Richart, J. Baliosian, J. Serrat, J. Gorricho, “Resource Slicing 
in Virtual Wireless Networks: A Survey”, IEEE Trans. on 
Network and Service Management, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 1-15, 2016. 
14. T. Koponen, et al., “Network virtualization in multi-tenant 
datacenters”, in Proc. 11th USENIX Symp. Netw. Syst. Design 
Implement., pp. 203-216, 2014. 
15. S.S. Hong, et al., “Picasso: Flexible RF and Spectrum Slicing”,  
Proc. of the ACM SIGCOMM, 2012. 
16. Y. Zaki, et al., “LTE Wireless Virtualization and Spectrum 
Management”, WMNC, 2011. 
17. C. Liang, F.R. Yu, “Wireless Virtualization for next generation 
mobile cellular networks”, IEEE Wireless Comms, vol. 22, no. 1, 
pp. 61-69, 2015. 
18. X. Wang, et al., “A Collaborative Spectrum-Sharing Framework 
for LTE Virtualization”, IEEE Conf. on CIC, 2015. 
19. Y. Zaki, et al., “LTE mobile network virtualization: Exploiting 
multiplexing and multi-user diversity gain”, Jour. Mobile 
Networks and Applications, vol. 16, pp. 424-432, 2011. 
20. R. Kokku, et al., “NVS: A Substrate for Virtualizing Wireless 
Resources in Cellular Networks”, IEEE/ACM Trans. on 
Networking, vol. 20, no. 5, pp. 1333-1346, 2012. 
21. M. Lopez-Martinez, J.J. Alcaraz, J. Vales-Alonso, J. Garcia-Haro, 
“Automated Spectrum Trading Mechanisms: Understanding the 
Big Picture,” Wireless Networks, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 685–708, 
2015. 
22. B. Liu, H. Tian, “A Bankruptcy Game-based Resource Allocation 
Approach among Virtual Mobile Operators,” IEEE 
Communications Letters, vol. 17, no. 7, pp. 1420–1423, 2013. 
23. M. N. Tehrani, M. Uysal, “Auction Based Spectrum Trading for 
Cognitive Radio Networks”, IEEE communications Letters, vol. 
17, no. 6, pp. 1168-1171, 2013. 
24. Y. Gu, W. Saad, M. Bennis, M. Debbah, Z. Han, “Matching 
Theory for Future Wireless Networks: Fundamentals and 
Applications”, IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 53, no. 5, 
pp. 52-59, 2015. 
25. D. Gale, L. S. Shapley, "College Admissions and the Stability of 
Marriage," American Mathematical Monthly, vol.69, no.1, pp. 9-
15, 1962.  
26. H. Xu, B. Li, “Seen as Stable Marriages”, Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, 
2011. 
27. O. Semiari, W. Saad, S. Valentin, M. Bennis, B. Maham, 
"Matching Theory for Priority-Based Cell Association in the 
Downlink of Wireless Small Cell Networks," in Proc. IEEE Int. 
Conf. on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing, pp. 444-448, 
2014. 
28. S. Bayat, R. Louie, Y. Li, B. Vucetic, “Cognitive Radio Relay 
Networks with Multiple Primary and Secondary Users: 
Distributed Stable Matching Algorithms for Spectrum Access,” in 
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Communications, pp. 1-6, 2011. 
29. S. Vassaki, M. I. Poulakis, A. D. Panagopoulos, “Spectrum 
Leasing in Cognitive Radio Networks: A Matching Theory 
Approach”, IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference, 2015. 
30. M. M. Gomez, M. B. H. Weiss, G. McHenry, L. Doyle, 
“Matching Markets for Spectrum Sharing”, Telecommunications 
Policy Research Conference, 2017. 
31. M. Baiou, M. Balinski, “Many-to-Many Matching: Stable 
Polyandrous Polygamy (or Polygamous Polyandry)”, Discrete 
Applied Mathematics, vol.101, no.1-3, pp. 1-12, 2000. 
32. A.E. Roth, M.A.O. Sotomayor, “Two-Sided Matching: A Study 
in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis”, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.  
33. M. F. Demirci, A. Shokoufandeh, Y. Keselman, L. Bretzner, S. 
Dickinson, “Object Recognition as Many-to-Many Feature 
Matching”, Int. Journal of Computer Vision, vol.69, no.2, pp. 
203-222, 2006. 
34. K. Hamidouche, W. Saad, M. Debbah, “Many-to-Many Matching 
Games for Proactive Social-Caching in Wireless Small Cell 
Networks”, Int. Symp. on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, 
Ad Hoc and Wireless Networks, pp. 569-574, 2014. 
35. C. Tsirakis, E. Lopez-Aguilera, P. Matzoros, G. Agapiou, D. 
Varoutas, “Spectrum Trading in Virtualized Mult-Tenant 5G 
Networks”, Int. Symp. on Wireless Communication Systems 
(ISWCS), 2018. 
36. J. Gillet, “Setting the Scene for Future MVNO Growth”, GSMA 
Intelligence Report, 2015.
 
